Religion in Public Education

Public schools prove to be fertile ground for debates over the Religion Clauses. In other units of this course, we see arguments about school prayer and university funding for student groups. And many of the issues and tensions discussed throughout this course find their way into debates over public school requirements. Why might public schools be so important for questions of religious freedom in America?

Both the establishment and free exercise clauses play an important role concerning divisive issues in public-school education. On the one side, religious students might believe that public-school policies restrict their religious exercise. On the other, easy alliances between religious majorities and school boards can raise the specter of establishment. For these cases, think about the impact of public-school education on students. Are there limits on what schools can compel students to do and learn? Can you see where tensions arise and what kinds of claims can be made on either side? 

The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor revisits these questions. The Court held that parents were entitled to a preliminary injunction where a school board introduced LGBTQ-inclusive storybooks and then withheld notice and opt-outs. The majority concluded that the combination of the storybooks and the denial of opt-outs substantially interfered with the religious development of the parents’ children and imposed a burden on religious exercise comparable in kind to the burden recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder. The Court stressed that it was not deciding the educational value of the curriculum, but only whether it could be imposed without an opportunity for religious opt-outs. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that the majority had mistaken exposure to ideas for religious coercion. In her view, public schools do not burden religious exercise merely by assigning books that conflict with some parents’ religious beliefs, and the majority’s approach risks making ordinary curricular decisions unworkable by constitutionalizing parental opt-out claims whenever families object on religious grounds.

Does Mahmoud revive Yoder, extend it, or transform it? How should courts distinguish ordinary exposure to ideas from a burden on religious exercise? Is the problem the curriculum, the age of the students, the lack of notice, the lack of opt-outs, the asserted normativity of the books, or some combination? Can Mahmoud be reconciled with Mozert? How about with Nathan v. Alamo?

Reading Assignment:

  • Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)

  • Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025)

Optional Reading: